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Introduction 
Cesagen is a multidisciplinary centre funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and is a collaboration between the Universities of Cardiff and Lancaster. Established 
in 2002, its remit is to examine the social, economic and ethical factors that shape science and
technology.  Our focus has been on genomics and genomics-related innovations, including 
ongoing work on stem cells and other developments in biotechnology.  We have also been 
widening our remit to explore convergence with other emerging technologies such as 
robotics, informatics, and the mind-machine interface. 
In what follows, we do not answer every question. We first proceed with our comments, 
referring to the numbered questions as appropriate. Thereafter, we provide examples from 
recent studies within Cesagen to illustrate more general insights for public policy. Excerpts 
from a case study (in appendix), illustrate some of the complications that arise in public 
consultation about human enhancement, in particular, with reference to idealistic perceptions 
which are strongly influenced by long-term popular imaginations about the future of humans 
and their societies. 
As we said in a response to a previous consultation, our position is that attention needs to be 
paid to how the technologies and the associated issues are framed – ethically, politically, 
scientifically, and by whom. This includes how a given technology is itself described 
(typically well before it actually exists, if it comes to do so); the claims made for its purported
benefits; how stakeholders are conceptualised; how social-cultural aspects will evolve.  Such 
framing is not exclusively a scientific and technological matter but involves cultural and 
social imaginations as well as artistic ones. Framing ought to be a democratic societal and 
reflexive effort, involving collective public meanings, desires, needs and concerns.
General issues raised by novel neurotechnologies
The key points we foreground under each sub-heading in this section on general issues, are 
relevant to questions 4 and 5 by the council. They also address conceptual and philosophical 
questions, prior to questions of ethics or policy.
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Convergence of mental, physical and virtual phenomena
Cesagen's research into BCIs and neurostimulation through work on the ICTethics and 
Technolife projects (FP7-funded  ), relies on similar definitions as the consultation document 
suggests, i.e., to distinguish between attempts to insert signals into the brain (here, 
neurostimulation) and extract signals from the brain (here, BCIs). However, we do not 
attempt to distinguish clearly between attempts to access the brain, and access the peripheral 
nervous system, other bodily functions or the body more generally. Many purposes for which 
research and experimentation proceeds, inserting and extracting signals, do not necessarily 
take into account these boundaries. Rather, ongoing experimentation and development of 
specific applications, raise expectations about convergence of physical, mental and virtual 
phenomena, with relevance for medical applications, safety and security applications, 
reconnaissance and battle field applications, and enhancement options. For example, we 
observe that Kevin Warwick's experiments in connecting computational functions to his own 
peripheral nervous system have implications for how we think of the role of the brain in 
facilitating a perception of the body (motor control and sensations), of the self and others 
(connecting with his wife's peripheral system). One can argue that his brain is indeed subject 
to an intervention. As he then argues himself, experiments with hybrid human-machine 
functions have implications for the future of security such as the potential ability to access 
places and objects from remote with one's 'mind'.1  We also observe experimentation and 
developments that promise to deliver body implants with active biosensors, capable of 
collecting, processing and broadcasting data/information.2 It is not far-fetched to envision 
applications that, for one or another purpose, read neuro-signals. If such implants find 
currency, whether that is for medical, non-medical, even recreational purposes, they will take 
bodies and minds online and thereby integrate them directly in what appears to be an 
indefinite expansion of cyberspace. We observe here a whole host of social-cultural, health, 
safety and security implications, blurring the boundaries between cyber- and biosecurity.
The convergence of nano, bio, info and cogno
We take the view that growing concerns about the development of novel neurotechnologies 
are intimately tied in with prevailing, diffuse but widespread, concerns about developments in
the biotechnologies more generally, and potential convergence with other technologies. 
Government sponsored reports and policy briefs from the past decade contemplate and 
support (at least provisionally) future research and development of conjoined nano- bio- 
information and cognitive (NBIC) technologies. They engage a promise of improved social 
welfare and security, access to new opportunities, social inclusion and individual well-being.3
They also speculate about improved physical and mental capabilities, modified and enhanced 
individuals and ever more military might, although, US-based views can be said to dominate 
1 Warwick, K. ‘Future issues with robots and cyborgs’ Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 4(3) (2010) . 
Available at: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/selt.2011.4.3/issue­files/selt.2011.4.issue­3.xml .
2 The Braingate company in the US were the first to attempt the marketing of implants with biosensors for 
glucose monitoring.
3 See e.g., Bibel, W., Andler, D., da Costa, O., et al. (2004). Converging Technologies and the Natural, Social 
and Cultural World. Report EU Commission;   Roco, M. C. and Bainbridge, W. S. (eds) (2002). Converging
Technologies for Improving Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology
and Cognitive Science. National Science Foundation (NSF/DOC­sponsored report);   Nordmann, A. 
(Rapporteur) (2004). Converging Technologies – Shaping the Future of European Societies. European 
Commission ­ HLEG Foresighting the New Technology Wave.
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in that area.4 It is therefore relevant to reflect on the conditions under which scientific-
technological innovations arise.
Novel neurotechnologies in the context of contemporary innovation practices and innovation 
policy.
Growing concerns over neurotechnologies relate to speculative and future-oriented visions of 
these technologies, albeit with reference to success in assisting some patients with, e.g., 
Parkinson's Disease and severe motor or mental impairments. They are 'emerging'—more 
based in immature and provisional research-based scientific-technological knowledge, than 
matured and robust knowledge. They continue to be experimental while they are still passing 
into society where the learning and development needs to continue as part of the ‘technology 
assessment’ process. They are also more driven, shaped and promoted by a combination of 
funders, R&D practitioners, users, commercial beneficiaries and other stakeholders, than has 
previously been the case.
Key issues here relate to the conditions of possibility, cultivated in the shaping of strategic 
research agendas, policy frameworks, distribution of subsidy and the impression of an urge 
within the UK, Europe and US to be competitive at the cutting-edge of progress. We observe 
that the role of science and technology in society underpins (and is inseparable from) the 
widely accepted social value of depending on science and technology to solve societal and 
existential ills.5
Innovation practices in the area of neurotechnologies also raise questions about conditions of 
accountability, created in strategic planning and resource allocation for the public good. 
Governing bodies, technologists, industrialists, technology assessment expertise, legal, social 
and ethical expertise are all implicated in decision-making and policy development. But what 
are accepted social values is a moving target, negotiated and renegotiated, while uncertainties
revolve around the culture of accountability in establishing political, social and ethical 
legitimacy of decisions on policy and regulation. We observe here two points that need 
further research, reflection and debate:
1. Disruptive innovation has taken on significant social value in its own right—to 
engineer developments with a view to improve individual and collective well-being, 
and the welfare of our societies more generally, through disruption. We ask if, prior to 
potentially disruptive interventions, visions of the future can be better democratised.
2. Hyperbolic expectations and promise are strongly indicative of how little is actually 
known about future benefits, risks and burden of the new innovations. In the case of 
neurotechnologies – also, info, cogno, bio and nano convergence – significant 
uncertainties surround the obscurity of what is wishful enactment and what is actually 
achievable.
4 Khushf, G. (2007). The ethics of NBIC convergence. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32(3). pp. 185-96.
5 Von Schomberg, R. (2007). From The Ethics of Technology towards an Ethics of Knowledge Policy & 
Knowledge Assessment. European Commission Services; von Schomberg, R. (ed) (2011). Towards 
Responsible Research and Innovation in the Information and Communication Technologies and Security 
Technologies Fields: A Report from the European Commission Services. European Union (DG for Research 
and Innovation).
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Case study excerpts (appendix) illustrate some of the confusions raised by common 
expectations of what novel modification and enhancement technologies can accomplish. The 
Technolife public forum on mind & body enhancement, analysed at Cesagen, shows clearly 
that techno-scientific realities, science fiction and techno-scientific utopias are not well 
distinguished in the public imagination. Moreover, on the basis of our organised meetings 
with experts as part of the ICTethics project, we argue that research communities (leaders and
visionaries) tend to blur these boundaries as well, in the ways in which knowledge is 
articulated and represented, and the future depicted.   
Philosophical questions engendered by the prospects of human enhancement
While we may have views about the principles that should be applied to human enhancement,
there are also questions about what would count as an enhancement and the difference 
between the concepts of ‘enhancement’ and ‘improvement’. 
(The following are two extracts from Chadwick, 2010)
Experiment 46 mentions a primitive form of telegraphic communication directly 
between  the nervous systems of two humans. The author [Warwick] described normal
human communication abilities, via language, as ‘so poor as to be embarrassing, 
particularly in terms of speed, power and precision’. The successful result of an 
implantation would be a ‘distinct advantage’.
We have to ask ourselves if it is so obvious that this is the case. What might be the 
advantages, rather than drawbacks, of speech being slow and imprecise? This is a 
very complex question – there are issues about human relationships, of course, but 
also of culture.
As regards human relationships, the first point is the implications for the possibility of
keeping things private. Although the way we currently are has downsides, such as the 
possibility of intentional deception of each other, there are also upsides to the 
possibility of privacy of thought. The forming of relationships and the very possibility
of deep relationships, presupposes that we are not completely open to everyone all the
time. How would this thought transfer be controlled? At present, communication is a 
complex mixture of speech and body language, in the interpretation of which some 
may be more skilled than others. It takes time to get to know someone really well. 
Why should speed be an advantage in general, rather than in certain very specific sets 
of circumstances?   The immediacy of comment facilitated by such developments as 
Twitter has not been universally advantageous to those who have chosen to reveal 
their thoughts.
When we turn to culture, the phenomenon of human speech and language, and the 
multi-faceted possibilities of analysis of layers of meaning, have been at the heart of 
6 This passage is taken from R. Chadwick’s response to Warwick, ‘New questions, or only old questions in a 
new guise?’ Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 4(3). Available at: 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/selt.2011.4.3/issue­files/selt.2011.4.issue­3.xml . Warwick's paper is 
published in the same issue: Warwick, K. (2010) ‘Future issues with robots and cyborgs’ ibid.
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human culture, tracing back to oral traditions, through the development of the written 
form, up to the IT era. The possibilities and difficulties of translation provide a focus 
of study themselves. Should we regard direct thought transfer as the inevitable next 
step? What might be lost?
In addition, in relation to any new development the question tends to be asked whether there 
are any new questions, or only old questions in a new guise. For example, Kevin Warwick7 
has written about an intelligent deep brain stimulator.  Do such brain-machine interfaces 
really give rise to questions that have not been encountered elsewhere (even if they have not 
yet been adequately answered)? 8
We are familiar, after all, with the effects of mind-altering drugs.  Experiments with 
transplantation of neural tissue, also, to treat Parkinson’s disease, are ongoing. There 
are, of course, real risks here – the side effects of drugs, the possibility of transplanted
tissue leading to a tumour or other pathogen-transfer, or to genetic change – but are 
the issues different in kind when we are dealing with brain-machine interfaces? The 
core of the issue here seems to be the description of the machine’s job as to ‘out-think 
the human brain’.  Drugs and transplants do not do that because they are not 
‘intelligent’, as the stimulator is described as being.  Much depends then on the 
description and how it is and should be interpreted.  The results of different kinds of 
intervention might be the same - or so similar that there may be little or no noticeable 
difference. If so then the question will be, in what ways, if any, does it matter that the 
result is achieved by this means? 
We go through life accepting, with more or less grace, that our bodies and 
psychological states will undergo enormous changes as we meet with situations and 
environments.  Some of these will affect our freedom of action to greater and lesser 
degrees.  The fact that an intelligent machine is preventing my brain from doing what 
it ‘wants’ to do is something I may accept because my natural brain is not doing what 
‘I’ want it to do in any case – the functioning of the natural brain according to the 
description of this case is just as much a threat to the ‘I’ as is the intelligent machine.  
This way of looking at it does pose questions for how we are to understand the ‘I’ – 
but this is certainly not a new philosophical puzzle. 
Modifications-as-experience: freedom of movement, morphology and 
choice (Questions 8, 9, 13, 14)
In the literature on novel neurotechnologies, we observe how concerns about human 
enhancement are almost exclusively cast in terms of improvement options that need to be 
addressed, debated and governed. This issue is particularly relevant to question 8 on 
expectations and concerns for BCIs, and question 13 about neurostimulation for non-medical 
purposes. What concerns us is the lack of engaging the notion of modification, rather than 
7 Warwick, K. ‘Future issues with robots and cyborgs’ Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 4(3) (2010) . 
Available at: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/selt.2011.4.3/issue­files/selt.2011.4.issue­3.xml .
8 This passage is also taken from R. Chadwick’s response to Warwick, ‘New questions, or only old questions 
in a new guise?’ ibid, footnote 7.
6
enhancement, and modification-as-experience rather than improvement options for strictly 
practical purposes. These distinctions were starkly foregrounded in a recent Master Class on 
implant technologies at the Wellcome Centre in London, organised by Cesagen on behalf of 
the ICTethics project.9 What appears to happen here is the omission of artistic imaginations 
and social-cultural imaginations about future bodies and minds. Consequently, a range of 
reasons for why people consider or seek modifications, risk being omitted from the academic 
and policy discourse.
We observe a range of treatises on the treatment-enhancement continuum versus treatment-
enhancement disruption. One example came up in the Technolife forum, to compare eye 
glasses with contact lenses, with laser corrective surgery, with a bionic eye. Can we say for 
sure that only the last on the list represents radical disruption, or perhaps the last two because 
they both involve irreversibility, thus a potential threat to the integrity of the person? While 
these are worthwhile considerations, it concerns us that there is a risk of omitting the 
continuum on which modifications (rather than treatment and enhancement) are more and 
more invasive. For example, they can shift from the piercing of genitals or the implantation 
of passive objects for modified sensations, to specialized materials (e.g. magnetic) to be 
activated for modified sensations and activities, to connect directly with the peripheral 
nervous system to control and connect with the environment in 'intimate' ways, to 
implantation into the brain to modify motor capabilities. It is important to note here that 
modifications, as they currently happen, are assisted not only by medical staff but in some 
cases by body modification artists where the boundary between medical and non-medical 
procedures risks blurring as well.
It is very clear to us that possibilities for both non-invasive and invasive BCIs to enhance 
performance in reconnaissance and battle field operations, draw attention to both physical 
risk factors associated with implantations as well as other risk factors associated with the 
increased intimacy of the human-device relationship. But while the military technologies 
include experimental development of applications for the purposes of:  1) positioning and 
tracking objects and bodies; 2) sensing and recording behavioural metrics (e.g., to decipher 
intentions); operating unmanned vehicles; 4) operating bomb sniffers and environmental 
sensors, the key-enabling technologies involved here are also developed in one or another 
form for civilian use.  This is evident, for example, in cumbersome and often laboratory-
bound work with disabled persons, using both non-invasive and invasive BCIs, as well as the 
latest gaming practices that use non-invasive BCIs.
We take the view here that an area of significant cultural currency and vogue is an experience
economy whose role in shaping near-future and mid-term developments of body and mind 
modifications cannot be underestimated.  New experiences are typically marketed through 
personalized services and products and counter-cultures come and go around particular 
fetishes. In this respect, it is a legitimate question to ask, to what extent body modification 
artists can take their craft, implanting 'smart' objects, how popular their services could 
become and what the implications of that might be. It is also relevant to ask what the 
relationship is between choices of modifying sensations and physical activities, and what we 
already know about the uses of fashionable drugs that are taken for mind- and experience-
altering purposes.
9 http://neicts.lancs.ac.uk/masterclasses.htm#masterclass1 .
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Freedom and choice
Choosing an intervening option to modify one's neurological functions, will have to take into 
account that in medical settings it may be difficult to assess how well informed someone's 
choice indeed is or in what sense people can be said to have a choice about decisions to 
intervene. Their choices are not likely to be made on the basis of information alone either, but
under the influence of advice and encouragement to make a good choice in the situation on 
the whole. Nevertheless, the person is deemed responsible in the face of determining 
challenges such as developing Parkinson's Disease and severe motor or cognitive impairment,
until otherwise diagnosed.
This example foregrounds how widespread assumptions about entrepreneurial selves and the 
framing of issues in terms of individual choice are challenged by different meanings of 
‘choice’ and how these are mobilized for different purposes—here, the good choice in more 
or less in-control situations.
Research at Cesagen has addressed at length different meanings of  ‘choice’ and how they 
feature in governance and regulation:
One position, identifiable with a 'liberal' political philosophy, is that the job of 
government, in relation to food (analogous to its job in other areas) is to ensure 
that the food that consumers eat is safe – but beyond that it is up to the 
individual what he or she eats.10
Chadwick goes on here to compare various approaches to governance and regulation with 
respect to how autonomy and choice is conceived. The conception in the excerpt above, she 
calls “a ‘thin’ account of individual autonomy”, where choice is confined to choosing for or 
against technological development or application on the basis of the information made 
available about it. This conception of choice takes for granted the empowerment of 
information and the technology itself, with ethical concerns centred mainly on accuracy, 
reliability and safety. We observe similarly that non-medical purposes for novel 
neurotechnologies are typically discussed with the presupposition of autonomy, that the 
agent's choice is primarily concerned with efficiency, productivity and competitiveness as 
integral to the preservation of optimal health and well-being. To presuppose that these 
concerns apply to most people is a mistake in our view, and when contemplating non-medical
modification choices, it is not clear what is actually an improvement, in what sense there is 
enhancement, and so on. Giving advice and encouragement to make a good choice is 
particularly problematic when we are not clear on what is realistically possible. Non-medical 
purposes also involve social-cultural imaginations, artistic imaginations, peer group pressure 
and so on, and relate to lifestyle choices with significant implications for selfhood and 
identity. For example, our participants in the Technolife forum on body and mind 
enhancement debated the terms, 'freedom' and 'choice' in hinting at social pressures to 
conform to certain body and mind types, as opposed to the possibility that enhancement 
choices will bring about new and unexpected configurations of humans. Some also remarked 
that we might choose enhancements that cannot change our societies, only deepen already 
10 From R.Chadwick, 'Nutrigenomics and statistical power: the ethics of genetically informed nutritional 
advice' in D. Bagchi et al., Genomics, Proteomics and Metabolomics (Wiley­Blackwell, 2010) pp. 23­33, 
which examines the different notions of choice at stake in relation to an emerging biotechnology.
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entrenched societal and environmental problems, thus leave us with less rather than more 
choice. In that sense we make collectively informed choices with collective rather than 
individual consequences.
Bodies and minds online
We argue that it is essential to take into account that future developments of both BCIs and 
neurostimulation will involve data gathering from the body or the brain in one or another 
form, and computational functions that manage data and information. Our concerns
in this respect have resonance in common problems associated with advanced sensory and 
data-management capabilities of information and communication technologies (ICTs).
ICT developments are notorious for challenging privacy and security. Identity-based data can 
be misused or incompletely processed and loss of privacy and equality is inevitable when 
citizens/consumers are subject to surveillance and sophisticated personal and activity 
profiling. Expansion of information services will also increase the risk of spamming, 
disclosure of private data and malicious attacks. 'Smart' applications can always go wrong or 
they do not function as expected. People are excluded from services due to lack of 
interoperability, inadequate profiling and data mismatches. Access to the technology is
also persistently unequal. To summarize, the key ethical concerns centre on dignity, privacy 
and data protection in operating implants for health management purposes and on careful 
deliberation on the uses of implants in selected social groups, for security and for tracking. 
There are questions of access to advanced therapies; quality-of-life issues such
as autonomy and independent living, risk management, safety and liability. As for both 
medical and non-medical applications, it remains to be clarified, however:
 Who is responsible, when implants fail to deliver the desired result or experience?
 Who owns data implanted in the body or collected from bodily/brain (neural) 
functions?
 Who accesses these data?
 Who is responsible when data propagate through constellations of services or get lost 
in data infrastructures?
Human-device intimacy
The more intimate the human-device relationships are, physically and emotionally, new 
issues of ethical relevance begin to take priority, including:
 Changing perceptions of body, self and/or identity
 New tracking, monitoring and adjustment capabilities of bodies, behaviour and state 
of being.
 New experiential opportunities (e.g. how far can body modification be taken ?)
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 Dangers of unequal access and lack of both distributive and commutative justice 
(health-related applications)
 Changing perceptions of warfare, policing and related safety and security operations 
(e.g. including BCIs in remote operations), endangering further alienation and distrust
between operators and their subjects.
To summarise, the most common issues we observe in our research, centre on the 
technicalisation of the body, human self-understanding, risk management, potential 
irreversibility, and an overarching question of the body as a resource, rather than sanctuary.
The respect for the dignity of the human is intimately tied in here with respect for self-
determination. Therefore, particular complications arise in relation to the deployment of 
'intimate' brain-computer interfaces and body-brain modification technologies more 
generally, in particular, when modifications are for military or other commission, command 
and control purposes –also, when operators, carers, relatives and anyone in a supervising role 
can configure devices and systems to intercept and interrupt the goings-on of other persons 
and, thereby, make decisions on their behalf which may leave them compromised in some 
way.
Commission, command and control purposes of modification and enhancement raise 
questions such as:
1. How decisions are made about commissioning someone to be modified for 
enhancement purposes?
2. Who 'owns' their capabilities and who is responsible for them?
3. How are decisions made about 'decommissioning' them when they are no longer in 
command and control?
BCIs for severe motor impairments also raise a range of problematic questions such as:
 What are the risks of psychosocial affects relating to disappointment and frustration 
when a BCI fails to deliver in spite of extensive training, when devices and systems 
are withdrawn after a successful trial, and so on.
 What are the hopes and the promises, and the extent to which quality of life can 
actually be improved with more independence, privacy and social participation.
Robust policy and decision-making criteria (Questions 10, 15)
Precaution
We take the view that looking at the potential issues here and anticipating future problems is
integral  to  the  reflexive  practices  of  anticipating futures  to  be  avoided and  to  exercise
precaution.
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Pragmatism and preparedness dictate that we embrace progress as long as it is a viable good, 
and that we critically evaluate what developments actually achieve for individuals and 
groups. A pragmatic stance can balance optimism and pessimism, hopes and fears, use and 
misuse. Preparedness and prudence also dictate that response to progress, in particular, the 
change engendered by new developments, occurs through the enactment of effective policy.
Questions and problems inherent to the development of BCIs, neurostimulation and neuro 
stem cell therapy include:
 Effects and side effects, runaway effects and other unintended consequences 
 The validity of presumed social acceptance or individual consent, given that 
subjects include deeply vulnerable persons
 Are we prepared to contemplate how access to state-of-the-art technologies should
be addressed, deliberated and articulated?
 How will legal claims be handled in the absence of historical precedence?
The question of whether or not it makes sense to ban specific types of developments depends 
on what the existing protocols for decision-making can deliver, in particular, methods of 
engaging stakeholders, formulating problems, assessing them and choosing issues for 
discussion and debate. In democratic secular societies, the legitimacy of particular decisions 
will have to be negotiated and renegotiated among those who are seen as stakeholders, 
bearing in mind that they always have agendas of their own. Conflicts over whether or not to 
ban or restrict developments of particular types of neurotechnologies will mainly stem from 
inadequate consultation or incompatible views. The typical candidates for banning include:
 Breaking the law
 Compromising individuals' control of their choices
 Too dangerous to one's health
 Breaching right to human dignity
 Breaching God's will
But the contentious issues may be less about particular types of developments and more about
particular types of uses or configurations for how to apply neurotechnologies. For example, 
brain implants are an invasive and highly risky technology but the success in therapeutic 
settings invite speculations on the extent to which, for example, behavioural traits could be 
controlled with implants. These speculations push the boundaries of what counts as 
'therapeutic purpose'. As it currently stands, brain implants in experimental and even the most
stable variety is only permitted for therapeutic purposes for which no other method is 
available.
What we learn here is that the decisions to ban will typically rest on the risk of extreme 
scenarios resulting from implants failing in one or another way. The seat of implantation is 
the brain, a prioritised organ facilitating the person, identity and self-hood. The potential 
damages caused by an improperly implanted device or from procedural complications are far 
reaching and involve an unforeseeable deterioration of the person.
Robust regulation
Visions of the future have always had performative and rhetorical roles in technology 
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development, however, there is clear evidence of a ‘strategic turn’ in the latter half of the 20th 
century. Innovation policies and strategic research agendas are increasingly more explicit 
with promises and expectations that resonate the dominant social-cultural and political 
sentiment that science and technology will solve our individual and societal problems.
The perceived need for ethical reflection and understanding of morality presupposes conflict 
and requires dedication to questions of who is in conflict and whose values are at stake. Much
less attention however, is devoted to the question of what the ethics ought to be ethics of. 
Ethics of technology tend to take the technology in question at face value, even if it does not 
yet exist except in scenarios of the future. The objects of reflection tend to be limited to 
potential impacts or outcomes for the lives and liberties of those who are likely to be affected 
or afflicted. Although 'downstream' engagement of this order helps to sort out deeply 
problematic issues of impacts and outcomes, it is inadequate in laying the foundations for 
robust ethical and policy frameworks. 
Critical engagement with expectations and promises of visionaries and research leaders is 
lacking:
 How well are promises and expectations understood by policy-makers, ethical, legal 
and social expertise?
 How well are technically and operationally relevant matters understood?
 How are socio-technical imaginaries mobilised and new technologies constructed
 How well are the boundaries understood, between wishful enactment and what is 
actually possible?
Critical examination of the emerging new economies is lacking
 Which socio-economic assumptions can be said to underpin strategic research 
agendas and visionary work?
 Which socio-economic assumptions underpin recent innovation policies?
 What is the role of competitiveness as a value?
Institutionalised ethics are limited in engaging professional ethicists as well as publics:
 How are problems actually framed?
 Which issues are selected for reflection and debate?
 How can we overcome the shortcomings of presuppositions about rationality and 
agency that go into the construction of participants in debates, as 'the public', 'the 
citizen', 'the patient' the 'expert'?
Social-cultural innovations and endogenous behaviour change are largely overlooked
 How do attitudes, concerns and orientations change over time?
 What are the effects of behaviour change for organisational/institutional operations?
There are consequences here for ethics and regulation as a result of the perceived need for 
harmonisation. Cesagen’s work has included an exploration of the meaning of harmonisation 
and standardization in this context11. It can further be argued that attention should be devoted 
11 Chadwick, R. and Strange, H. ‘Harmonisation and standardisation in ethics and governance: conceptual and 
practical challenges’, in H.Widdows and C.Mullen (eds) The Governance of Genetic Information: Who 
Decides (Cambridge, 2009) pp. 201­13.
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to the politics of decision-making, innovation policy development, visionary work, the 
involvement of industries, and how new bodies of knowledge and operational expertises are 
constructed.  Robust decision-making protocols will therefore need to ensure a balance of 
research with different focuses and aims:
 Downstream studies of potential impacts of the technologies that are already in the 
last stages of development and deployment (to minimise risks, maximise benefits and 
distributive justice, and improve wider acceptance)
 Upstream studies of imaginary impacts of technologies which may or may not be 
realizable (contribute alternative visions and scenarios of the future)
 Research into democratic negotiations of the very practices of envisioning and 
planning for future lifeworlds (contribute alternative futures).
Finally, policies and regulation on modifying performance or functions of the brain and 
peripheral nervous system ought to be informed by much better understanding of:
 Which experiential cultures are likely to find currency and which do not. (connecting 
nervous systems in gaming, artistic performance, sex?)
 To what extent are body modification artists willing to take their craft.
 To what extent are artists, like scientists, willing to self-experiment and set trends
 What unintended consequences have emerged from existing experimentations
 How are responsibilities managed in non-medical experimental scenarios.
Risks and benefits of neural stem cell therapy (Question 17) 
The risks and benefits of neural stem cell therapy may not be well understood by either 
clinicians or the public (i.e. patients).  It is a matter of some importance that patients & 
families actively seek out the clinics with links to potential transplant programmes, and many
people will agree to anything in the hope of a cure or of a halt to disease progression. Patients
told one Cesagen researcher that they would 'go for [stem cell therapy] without a minute's 
hesitation'.12
French and US literature on previous human neural grafts of foetal stem cells, shows variable 
results with lesions re-occurring in some transplanted areas, and/or lesions occurring in non 
grafted areas.13  Hughes’ ethnography of a research clinic found that this information was not 
12 Hughes, J. 2010. After genetics : Huntington's disease, local data, global neuroscience. (PhD) Cardiff 
University.
13 Cicchetti, F., Saporta, S., Hauser, R. A., et al. (2009). Neural transplants in patients with Huntington's disease
undergo disease-like neuronal degeneration. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 106. pp. 12483-8;  Keene, C. D., Sonnen, A., Swanson, P. D., et al. (2007). Neural 
transplantation in Huntington disease - Long-term grafts in two patients. Neurology 68(24). pp. 2093-8;  
Keene, C. D., Chang, R. C., Leverenz, J. B., et al. (2009). A patient with Huntington's disease and long-
surviving fetal neural transplants that developed mass lesions. Acta Neuropathol. 117(3). pp. 329-38.
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always made readily available to patients.14 Of course, this information may be irrelevant if 
the procedure is not available, and patients, families and the public can search on the web 
themselves (and they do). However, risks and benefits tend to be subsumed under one or 
more of the following type of provisos:
a) “We are not doing any transplants at the moment, and in any case we don't 
know if you would be a suitable candidate. It's likely that appropriate people 
would be in the early stages of disease.”
b) “It's a very experimental procedure and its too early to say what the chances 
are.”
c) “You are in the right place for when developments start to come through.”
So there is a tacit implication that research clinic attendance may prove to be beneficial even 
if only in terms of information, not treatment.
Ethical and social issues (Question 18) 
The tissue from aborted foetal cells is black boxed - everyone (clinicians and patients alike) 
says 'stem cells', Hughes noted that no distinction was made in clinic interactions which 
discussed transplantation during her study.15
People with neurodegenerative diseases and their families are desperate for treatment and will
take any risk to get it in most cases. They seek out those clinics they consider will give them 
an edge in being the 'first on the list'.
The patients may be losing cognition- and this is an important factor in terms of informed 
consent for any procedure. Patients in this position became very distressed when advised they
cannot have stem cell transplants, even when transplant was not available. There is a certain 
amount of pathologising of this distress. If transplants were readily available, affected people 
may be even more distressed if not 'selected'. This type of distress is not often considered to 
be a 'medical harm', yet this can have a huge impact on families coping with the disease. It is 
not considered as a risk in the ethical framework of research programmes which are simply 
monitoring the patients' disease condition and gathering data.
It would be of value to conduct systematic ethnographic research on the understandings of 
tissue donors and potential patients as to any recognition of a special status accorded to tissue
engineered brain tissue as opposed to other tissue types -- e.g. liver, kidney, skin etc in 
notions of identity and selfhood. The cell source mechanism may also be a variable here (iPS,
hESC, neural tissue). In terms of autologous therapies, patient and patient family 
understandings of the processes applied to their own tissue, and the status of their own neural 
tissue in an in vitro context requires exploration. These issues remain pertinent in research 
processes prior to transplant via cell injection, for example the understandings of patient cell 
14  Supra, n.11.
15  Supra, n.11.
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donors whose neural tissue is being used as a model of disease, either In Vitro or transplanted
into laboratory animals.
Non-medical uses of neuro stem cell therapy (Question 19) 
This may prove extremely popular with the public and become a mark of status such as 
cosmetic surgery seems to be. Given that some people consider 'stem cells' to be a more 
'natural' therapy16, there may be fewer barriers to its adoption. However, will it create whole 
sections of society who have access to this and others who do not? Will it create a market for 
saviour embryo siblings for stem cell supplies? How does society decide what is human 
enhancement and what is not? What will be most affected - neurological functions, sport, 
physical body enhancement such as idealised male/female forms, fashionable/tribal forms in 
more severe ways than piercing or tattooing?  A thorough public discussion is necessary 
about the pros and potential cons.
Regulating neural stem cell therapy (Question 20)
Since much of this research is being conducted with foetal material it would be of value to 
access the extent to which regulatory frameworks for sourcing foetal material from hospitals 
are standardised and transparent across the UK, along with how the tissue is transported back 
to (and kept in) the hospital where the surgical implantation will presumably take place.
Much of the current regulation appears to be in place on a paper trail in the run up to projects.
There is also a long negotiation process from ethical approval to obtaining R & D approval. 
This is based on hypothetical situations in most cases and cannot cover every eventuality. It is
often the case in research that situations arise which have not been considered - some form of
speedy regulatory advice is vital. The continuing regulation of use of material relies on the 
integrity of scientists and operators of research, with further paper exercises such as audits. 
This is time consuming and potentially problematic for scientists and lab workers. But wider 
use of these technologies would mean more of the same. It would be good to have a 
regulatory system in operation which freed scientists from the tyranny of paperwork, but 
which also gave security to everyone i.e the users/developers of the neural material, the 
owners of the material, the surgeons and the patients who receive the material. This may be in
the form of access to neural materials being licensed, limited or regulated in some way. This 
may happen already in one way or another. It may also need a new regulatory body. There 
does need to be a way to inspire and develop public confidence in the methods and uses of 
neural stem cells, and provide reassurance that the work is well managed for the public good.
16 Supra, n.11
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Appendix: Case Study 
Technolife: Social imaginaries and ethical issues in deliberative process on Body and 
Mind Enhancement
This case study is comprised of extracts from a report that analyses an online public forum 
addressing ethical issues relating to questions of body and mind enhancement. The report is 
authored by Kristrún Gunnarsdóttir, Adrian MacKenzie and Brian Wynne, and it is one of 
Cesagen's contributions to the FP7-funded research project, Technolife (Contract No: FP7-
230381) – http://neicts.lancs.ac.uk/technolife-wp4.htm. The extracts were written by Kristrún
Gunnarsdóttir.
Introduction
This deliverable reports on the analysis of a virtual forum discussing body and mind 
enhancement. The forum was facilitated by KerTechno (see D3.1)17, and invitations were 
extended to a number of individuals and groups who are considered stakeholders of one or 
another kind: experts, administrators, relevant occupations, interest groups, and more (see 
D2.0)18. Discussions were kick-started with a short provocative film19, drawing on a scoping 
exercise attempting to capture the 'hot topics' engendered by body and mind enhancement 
technologies. The scoping paper (D1.3)20 identifies an increasing preoccupation with issues of
immortality and a juxtaposition of a world of bodies with virtual existence and identities.  
The scoping paper also explores scenarios, depicting efforts of overcoming imperfections, 
ailments, shortcomings and finitude. They disclose a future world of more capable, healthier 
and longer lasting bodies and minds, even super-soldiers and super-intelligence (see e.g. 
Roco and Bainbridge, 2002)21. Science fiction has for a long time played a major role in 
cultivating such visions where body and mind enhancement is speculated on, but also tried 
and tested as indicated by recent developments in the use of implants or by latest advances in 
bionics and reconstructive surgery.
Particular complications arise against the emergence of transhumanism (e.g. Bostrom, 
2005)22. Techno-scientific utopias, such as Ray Kurzweil's notion of Singularity, scenarios of 
leaving the body behind for virtual existence in cyberspace, and new body cultures that 
fetishise modification (tattoo, fitness, fashion, implants and cosmetic surgery), are all 
ethically and substantively challenging. The virtual existence of a person is a digital 
'placeholder', perfection is an unstable category, and whether or not quality of life can be 
improved upon remains an empirical matter. Many existing enhancement technologies are 
experimental with uncertain and unpredictable results. And, apart from potential physical 
complications, there are issues regarding changes in emotion, personality and identity, and a 
risk of deep disappointment.
17 http://neicts.lancs.ac.uk/pdf/Technolife-D3-1-DocumentationOfKerDST.pdf .
18 http://neicts.lancs.ac.uk/pdf/Technolife-D2-TheoreticalFramework.pdf .
19 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STiuB7nQn1w
20 http://neicts.lancs.ac.uk/pdf/Technolife-D1-3-Scoping-Body.pdf .
21 Roco, M. C. and Bainbridge, W. S. (eds) (2002). Converging Technologies for Improving Human 
Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science. National 
Science Foundation (NSF/DOC-sponsored report).
22 Bostrom, N. (2005). In defense of posthuman dignity. Bioethics 19(3). pp. 202-14.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
A controversial film?
If the short provocative film “was intended to be controversial”, as Bryan [forum participant] 
puts it (D4.3.8, line 2), one has to ask how exactly it is controversial with reference to the 
direct responses we observe. For example, we observe overwhelming optimism and a positive
disposition regarding the potential of body and mind enhancement. “I think it will be quite 
natural” (D4.3.5, line 5), “technological developments will almost  certainly make it possible 
for human beings  to live really longer and in better health” (D4.3.6, lines 5-6). In other 
words, “very beneficial for […] people [… and] for society at large” (D4.3.6, lines 13 and 16-
17). A significant incentive here is improved life quality and life expectancy with 'spare part' 
replacements and modifications of the body, including the brain. The narrator in the film 
offers [t]otal freedom, freedom of movement, freedom of morphology, freedom of choice. 
According to contributors who indicate they feel that people should have those freedoms, the 
freedoms appear to be conceived of as possession or 'right'. It is noteworthy in this respect 
how substantive challenges to common medical treatments typically signal lack of freedom 
and choice in light of physical/material complications, often followed by disappointment and 
frustration. Justification for treatment (or enhancement) on the basis of improved life-quality 
needs matching against the contractual complexity of entering treatment, and questions are 
inevitably raised about the voluntariness of subjects and others involved. That said, it remains
obscure if participants' imaginaries on future bodies and minds are science fiction or possibly 
deemed to be of techno-scientific credibility.
Direct evidence, showing that the film raised alarm among participants, centres on three issue
clusters. The first cluster concerns the uses of the term 'perfection' and, by proxy, the terms 
'normal' and 'natural'. Participants either latch onto these terms uncritically or they are very 
sceptical and find “the concept of 'perfection' misleading” (D4.3.1, line 2). The quest for 
perfection “is like the quest for wealth […] it is never enough” (D4.3.2, lines 2-3), and the 
term is used “as if it were possible to somehow reach an ultimate goal” (D4.3.3, lines 5-6). 
The second cluster concerns critiques of consumer/mass-market exploitation. Beth [forum 
participant] is particularly opposed to representations of enhancement technologies as if they 
were new gadgets for mass consumption. Although, it might be perfectly reasonable to expect
new technologies to develop in a market democracy, the juxtaposition of mass-marketable 
enhancement products versus personalized products and services, indicates that there are 
different ways in which the new developments could go forward. Finally, the third cluster of 
questions turns on why we might want these developments, who has access to them, who can 
pay or who is willing to pay.
Taken together, these immediate responses to the film set the tone for further discussion and 
debate that addressed more directly the suggested focus topics of the forum, i.e., on 
perfection, freedom of choice and the question of humans becoming cyborgs. For example, 
discussing the quest for perfection has already foregrounded issues of social and ethical 
relevance, with reference to social-cultural versus objective 'perfection'. Normative indicators
of perfection such as happy, healthy and beautiful are also subject to doubt and some 
confusion. The topic of having freedom to choose one's body and mind is also hinting at 
social pressures to conform to certain body and mind types, as opposed to the possibility that 
enhancement will bring about new and unexpected configurations of humans. One could 
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argue that the reference in the short film to the Nazi agenda of 'perfect' bodies and minds, 
without pain or limits, would encourage discussion along those lines of conformity versus 
choice, however, the only direct response to that scene called the comparison with current 
discourse on body and mind enhancement ridiculous. But, we see a macro-proposition 
emerge, telling us that, body and mind enhancement is inevitable and will create previously 
unknown varieties so we should prepare for a widening range of human capabilities. Finally, 
between two participants, Ben and Bart (D4.3.9), still another proposition emerges, telling us 
that, the future will unfold in ways we may or may not like, but if we cultivate a sense of 
ethics and morality, 'professional ethics' will be redundant.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Addressing the topics: Issues of ethical and social relevance taking shape
. . . . As these discussions on perfection and desire for improvement progress, we notice how 
participants touch on questions of haves and have-nots, visions of scarcity and post-scarcity, 
and the role of capitalism in creating the need (greed) and strive for perfection, superiority, 
and so on.  One view we observe states that dystopian scenarios of haves and have-nots are 
crafted to artificially generate moral conversations, utilising new technologies to discuss 
ethics along economic class lines and in ways that seek to guarantee moral outrage at the 
ruling class. But some of our participants are deeply concerned about enhancement 
technologies progressing under the dominant socio-economic and political conditions in 
Western countries where the ruling classes cannot be trusted. One participant also suggests 
that perhaps we are seeking to overcome body and mind imperfections which are merely the 
symptoms of imperfect situations, namely, the radical product/consumer agendas of 
contemporary societies. Finally, these discussions point out the unequal and unfair 
distributions of good and bad qualities already, i.e., neither nature nor nurture are equal and 
fair, and the question is raised, whether we maintain these differences by striving for a state 
of perfection. In other words, the world is already unfair and enhancements can possibly turn 
that around, keep it much the same or exacerbate it.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Participants also begin to differentiate between therapy and enhancement in their discussions 
on freedom of choice. They raise the issue of sickness and death as naturally integral and 
essential to our existence, and one participant asks explicitly why we push these factors as far
away as possible from our lives. These and similar sentiments draw attention to questions of 
'naturalness' of the variety of experiences and existential ills we are ordinarily faced with. As 
some participants emphasise, we might have misconceived ideas about perfecting 
imperfections, like our susceptibilities to a range of common diseases which perhaps are 
simply the consequences of environmental/societal problems. Such imperfections would go 
away if everyone had clean air and water, enough space, naturally cultivated foods, access to 
basic medicine, and so on. However, chances are that we choose enhancements that cannot 
change our societies, only deepen already entrenched societal and environmental problems. 
This is perhaps most starkly illustrated in the view that is useless to deliberate the 'goodness' 
of supreme health and enhanced intelligence because these are self-evidently good and the 
choices should be accessible to everybody. As some of our participants point out, 
accessibility for everyone is not the kind of world we live in.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
The question of whether living longer and staying beautiful will lead to super-humans or 
cyborgs, affords a number of speculations. First we observe that participants consider the 
question of 'normal' as gradually changing its meaning to connote, living as one pleases, 
looking and acting which ever way one chooses. In other words, 'normal' will assume 
'variety', possibly transcending conventional notions of beauty or perfection. Whether the 
future holds biological or digital varieties in store is left by participants as an open question. 
They engage in deliberations on the possibility of developing digital personalities and going 
viral, of a future of regenerative medicine, molecular-scale tools, and the possibility of 
integrating artificial systems into the body. One view we observe is that enhancement 
technologies are considered to be like any other assistive technology. The boundaries of what 
counts as invasive are blurred and different technologies sit on a continuum, say, from eye 
glasses, to contact lenses, to laser corrective surgery, to the bionic eye. Here we see again 
how enhancement is placed on a continuum with treatment, however, participants do not 
agree. Another view is that distinctly invasive measures are disruptive in the sense that we 
will most certainly see permanent irreversible alterations of humans and our socio-technical 
systems. The question is asked if we can be in control of such radical alterations, but also 
why not to take our destiny into our own hands to go with it.
A substantial development in this discussion pertains to arguments which are highly critical 
of the dominant socio-economic and political conditions. Technological advancements are 
currently a proprietary business but the core of this critique seems to spur the idea that 
advancements will ultimately enable utopian conditions—a world in which there is no 
scarcity and only minimal if any cost of obtaining tools/devices or basic necessities. The 
model for this utopia is primarily the success of open-source software, the changing 
computing capacity-price ratio over the years and the spread of mobile, smart, and personal 
computing to all corners of the world. Computing is also the reference point for believing in a
future of converging nano, bio, information and cognitive technologies, involving nano 
factories, self-replicating mechanisms and more. One of the consequences of this computing 
analogy is the perception that biotechnology will shift from generalised mass-marketable 
products, a way from big corporate enterprise, toward personalized technologies, open-to-all 
recipes in a highly participation-based model, similar to how the open-source communities 
work. Biotechnology will not need ivory towers but passionate individuals who can both 
learn and contribute, for example, to bio-informatics, genomics and proteomics. We could 
reach a society of naturally evolving experts in everything—a future of automated virtual 
tools for lay persons to design organisms or a future where tasks currently done in big 
laboratories, can be accomplished by 2-3 graduate students. Such a development would 
counter the current 'competitive edge' aspect of enhancement technologies. But another 
implication of this analogy for the future of human bodies and minds, is that computing is on 
the brink of being internalised completely into our practices. It will eventually transcend all 
previous distinctions of user-groups, categories and classifications and create an oracle which
will be intelligent in its own right. One enhancement is to be super-connected, another to be 
filled with cutting edge smart body and/or brain implants, still another to be 'uploaded' into 
the super-connected system.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Ethics of body and mind enhancements
As we point out in the introduction to this report, the scoping exercise identifies 
preoccupation with immortality and convergence of the virtual, mental and physical. We learn
that science fiction has played a major role in cultivating visions of body and mind 
enhancements while recent developments in the use of implants and advances in bionics give 
some idea of what the implications might be of using such technologies to enhance humans. 
We also learn that techno-scientific utopias that fetishise modifications or speculate on 
leaving the body behind for virtual existence in cyberspace, give us some idea of what we 
expect, hope or fear the future might look like.
Techno-scientific realities, science fiction and techno-scientific utopias are not well 
distinguished in the forum and this obscurity draws together our key observation, idealistic 
imaginaries, whether or not our participants are optimistic, sceptical or fearful about body 
and mind enhancements. One can argue, with good reason, that imaginaries are just that. 
There are no limits to what can be conceived of and depicted as a socio-technical imaginary 
because an imaginary lacks the friction of actual socio-technicalities. For example, there is 
consistent lack of association with the complexities of entering any kind of substantial 
medical treatment and being the body-in-treatment—the pain, the side-effects, delays in 
recovery, long-term effects, and the possibility of never being the same again and, 
consequently, one's life never the same again either. Becoming an 'other' in that way, does not
represent the kind of imagined modifications our participants discuss and debate.
What we also observe is how the forum is almost exclusively concentrated on enhancements 
as such, in the sense that modifications of bodies and minds which would normally not be 
seen as enhancement, are omitted from the discussion. One can argue that the social semiotics
of the film persistently draw the attention away from modification-as-experience, while 
pushing an agenda of enhancements for the practical purposes of being happy, healthy, 
beautiful and forever young, along with stereotyped manifestations of those qualities. We 
argue that this is indeed a shortcoming, for example, considering the lengths to which 
participants express their sentiments toward dominant socio-cultural conditions and 
orientations. Namely, a considerable development in recent decades concerns the 'experience 
economy' –an area of significant cultural currency whereby new experiences are marketed 
through personalized services and products. In this respect, it would be a legitimate question 
to ask to what extent body modification artists can take their craft, implanting 'smart' objects 
into bodies, and how popular such practices could become and what the implications of that 
might be.
However, in spite of any shortcomings in the orientation of discussion topics in our forum, 
we observe how thinking about the future of humans, cast in terms of body and mind 
enhancement, serves as a screen upon which we collectively project depictions of ourselves 
as individuals, our place in the world and relationship with each other and with progress, for 
better or worse. Participants produce a number of projections of this order in communicating 
the quest for perfection (including super-bodies and super-intelligence), the inevitability of 
progress through exponential growth in techno-scientific advancement, the role and viability 
of the dominant socio-economic system, and the journey ahead towards a new world order. 
We already observe this in responses to the film, producing these propositions:
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 Perfection is untenable, an endless and flawed quest, and a lie to exploit consumer 
behaviours to market it.
 Body and mind enhancement is inevitable and will create previously unknown 
varieties so we should prepare for a widening range of human capabilities.
 The future will unfold in ways we may or may not like, but if we cultivate a sense of 
ethics and morality, 'professional ethics' will be redundant.
We further observe the emergence of propositions such as:
 People will not want the same for themselves as everyone else. They want to be 
unique and innovative.
 Enhancements should never be one-size-fits-all in case of a biological or digital attack
 It is useless to debate the 'goodness' of supreme health and enhanced intelligence. 
These qualities are self-evidently good.
 Neither nature nor nurture are fair in their distribution of qualities. Enhancements can 
turn that around, keep it much the same or exacerbate it.
We also observe propositions with which participants position themselves in their 
discussions, for example, there are progressives and luddites. But overall, our participants 
produce a wide range of projections of how the betterment of ourselves and the world at 
large, could be improved with technology, not in terms of productivity or efficiency, but 
enjoying life, better understanding of the world, helping humanity progress, and so on. 
Serious and tragic consequences are made clear as well to some extent. What stands out 
however, is the projection of a new world order, anticipating the emergence of open-source 
biotechnology. These utopian conditions depict a world of no scarcity and only minimal cost 
of tools/devices or basic necessities—a future of converging nano, bio, information and 
cognitive technologies, involving nano factories, self-replicating mechanisms and computing 
that transcends all previous obstacles so we can be super-connected, filled with cutting edge 
smart body and/or brain implants.
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